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It was Hiawatha Bray, a columnist for The Boston Globe who
writes about information technology, who broke the story, at
least in my town. In a column on 3 February this year, he
recounted what happened to the Litchfield brothers, a pair of
British computer security experts whose company, Next Gen-
eration Software, specializes in developing programs to help
businesses and governments defend against computer viruses
and hackers. Mark and David Litchfield are experts at finding
weaknesses in widely used software, and last year they found a
bug in Microsoft’s SQL Server database software. To establish
that the bug could be used to cripple computer networks,
David Litchfield wrote an exploit program, a kind of dummy
virus. The existence of the bug, a buffer overflow problem, was
then communicated to Microsoft, which published a fix in
July. Other security experts had already been asking for copies
of the exploit program so they could test their own systems
and become familiar with this new potential method of attack-
ing networks, and David Litchfield eventually released his
code, but only after the patch to fix the program had been pub-
lished. He thought, quite reasonably, that once the fix was
available, SQL Server users would no longer be vulnerable. 
He was wrong. On the last weekend in January, the Slammer
worm struck. Millions of computers were attacked, and the
entire worldwide web was crippled for some time. Busi-
nesses are estimated to have lost tens of billions of dollars. It
seems that many corporations and individuals hadn’t yet
bothered to install the patch. And David Litchfield discov-
ered, to his horror, that his code was used as the template for
the worm. To be sure, any good programmer could have
worked out the code without help, but because of the Litch-
fields’ well-meaning publication of their exploit program,
that hadn’t been necessary. Now Mark and David Litchfield
must decide whether they will ever again publish or distrib-
ute their exploit programs. They have received hundreds of
e-mails from colleagues begging them to continue releasing
such code, because many in the computer business believe
that the best way to deal with such weaknesses in widely dis-
seminated programs is to publicize them and make examples
widely available. But these colleagues don’t have to live with
the feelings of responsibility that the Litchfields now have.
So from now on, every bug they discover - and they’ve
already found others, in Microsoft’s Windows XP and 2000
operating systems - will call for their judgement. 
A similar judgement call was made a few weeks ago by the
editors of a number of life-science journals, who released a
statement of a new policy regarding the publication of
reports of scientific research in areas such as microbiology
and genomics that could potentially be of use to bioterror-
ists. The policy, which has received widespread attention,
permits the journals to request that experimental details be
omitted from papers if, in the view of the editors or a panel
of experts (depending on the journal), the information could
be misused. In some cases, publication of the work could be
embargoed altogether. 
The policy has been sharply criticized. The arguments
against it would be familiar to the Litchfields: that any form
of censorship runs contrary to the spirit of science; that it
creates a slippery slope leading to government control; that
free exchange of ideas and data represents the best way to
anticipate possible misuses of science and technology and to
generate the methods to counter them. 
The demand for freedom of inquiry and the open exchange of
information always wars with the demand for security. While
recognizing that absolute security is impossible, governments
have a legitimate right - and a duty - to take reasonable steps
to protect the lives of their citizens. In a repressive society,
such steps are merely part of the general curtailing of liberty.
But in a free society the trick is to strike a balance between
protection and oppression. There is always a danger, as the
witch-hunting excesses of the Cold War remind us, that one
can destroy a free society in the name of saving it. 
I am completely in agreement with those who worry that
this danger is near. The US government has recently showndisturbing tendencies to ignore the fundamental freedoms of
its citizens for the sake of what many of us believe is a false
sense of security. Other governments are unlikely to resist
the temptation at least to control the public’s access to infor-
mation, a goal that many in power have secretly harbored
for years. 
But I am not in favor of doing nothing. At the heart of many
of the objections to the policy of the journal editors, I
believe, is a basic sense that the corruption of biology for evil
purposes is unlikely. I recognize, and share, the concerns of
my colleagues that even self-censorship, as a concept, sets a
dangerous precedent. But I wonder if many scientists - who
after all tend to have a mostly positive view of human nature
as a result of largely associating with other scientists, a class
of humanity not known for crimes or acts of violence - have a
realistic perspective on the existence of evil. 
I once taught a course in the social history of the detective
story to a class of extremely bright, well-read college fresh-
men. As part of the discussion one afternoon, I asked them if
they thought that evil existed. Almost to a person, they
argued that real evil was a literary abstraction. Historical
examples I offered were dismissed as illustrating madness,
not evil. The notion that someone could be technically sane
yet delight in human suffering and death was something
they were neither prepared nor willing to accept. I suspect
that many scientists may feel the same way. 
Professional writers, whose careers depend on understanding
the human condition, tend to be less starry-eyed. Two noted
science-fiction authors have explored this subject in stories
that are eerily similar. The older story, ‘The Supreme
Moment’, was unpublished during the lifetime of its author,
Robert E. Howard, best known for his fantasy tales of Conan
the Barbarian. It was eventually published in 1984 in Crypt of
Cthulhu magazine #25 and reprinted in The New Howard
Reader #1, edited by Joseph W. Marek. The story concerns
five wealthy, powerful men who are trying to convince a crip-
pled scientist to save the human race from a fungus that is
spreading across the earth, destroying all vegetation. The sci-
entist, Zan Uller, knows how to make a fungicide but refuses
to reveal the formula. As a justification, he explains that he
had a tormented childhood and a career bedeviled by sabo-
tage from rival scientists, persecution by religious fanatics,
and ridicule for his discoveries. His five visitors threaten to
force him to reveal the formula by torture, believing it justi-
fied to save the planet. Before they can act, to forestall them
and to take his vengeance on a world that has given him
nothing but misery, Uller commits suicide. 
‘Judgement Day’, by L. Sprague de Camp (who, interest-
ingly, was chosen to complete Howard’s unfinished Conan
stories after the latter’s early death), was published in the
August 1955 issue of Astounding Science Fiction magazine
and later reprinted by Ballantine Books in The Best of
L. Sprague de Camp. A physicist, Wade Ormont, has
developed a  formula for a nuclear reaction using iron, a
cheap, widely available material. If he publishes the details
of his discovery, he realizes that the probability is high that
someone will eventually use it to destroy the world. Although
he doubts that the US government would do that he is con-
vinced that if he turns over his information to them it will
eventually become more widely known: as the theft of the
atom-bomb secrets proved, nothing can be kept hidden
forever. In thoughts that chillingly echo our concerns about
rogue states and terrorist organizations with weapons of
mass destruction, Ormont decides that sooner or later some
‘crackpot’ head of state will use this capability to wreak
havoc on a planet-wide scale. He then reflects on his own life
history. Like Uller in The Supreme Moment, he had a child-
hood filled with physical and verbal abuse. His marriage
failed and most of his other human contacts have been brief
and hostile. An attempt at therapy quickly ended when he
resented the psychiatrist’s description of his personality as
schizoid. Now in his mid-50s, enfeebled by a heart condition
and with little will to live, he has become thoroughly misan-
thropic. He guesses that even if he publishes his formula in
an obscure place, it would be discovered and used by a
madman within a decade or two, and it is unlikely that he
would live to see the end of the world. Finally, he reaches a
decision: “There is one way I can be happy during my
remaining years, and that is by the knowledge that all these
bastards will get theirs someday ... I hate everybody ... I shall
write my report.” 
Both Howard and de Camp recognize that there can be
people who are capable of great acts of malice and vindic-
tiveness. It used to be argued that no one would be likely to
use a chemical, biological or nuclear weapon since to do so
would lead to far too great a risk of the user’s own destruc-
tion, either through retaliation or the failure to control the
damage from one’s own use. The advent of suicide bombers
and eschatological cults like Aum Shinrikyo should dispel
that notion. There are people who would not blanch at the
end of the world, or at least the destruction of large parts of
it, and who hold their own lives (or, more commonly, the
lives of their followers) very cheaply. Some of them are
neither so insane as to be incapable of cunning nor so tech-
nically inept as to be unable to adapt ‘peaceful’ discoveries to
their own ends. It is true that most of their activities up to
now have been of the low-tech kind, and they probably will
continue to be for the near future, but it is indisputable that
at least some of them have tried to obtain or develop biologi-
cal weapons, and it seems certain that such attempts will
continue. 
“We often forget that our actions…can have very real conse-
quences in real life,” David Litchfield wrote shortly after the
Slammer incident. I think the biological community has to
face the fact that software experts - and physicists and
chemists - are no longer alone in their nightmares over the
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ethically speaking, catches up with technological evolution,
we will all have to live with this possibility. The policy
adopted by the journal editors seems to me a wise attempt to
seize the initiative from those in government who would use
the public’s increasing fear of biology as a license for repressive
control of scientific research and publication. As a community,
I think we should adhere to this policy for the time being
while continuing to debate its merits and considering alterna-
tives. During these discussions, we will no doubt also be asking
ourselves how we would feel, and what the consequences to
our profession would be, if one of our publications were to
form the blueprint for a terrorist act. If we have trouble
imagining the answers, Mark and David Litchfield do not. 
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